Mary Ziegler: What it means to lose a constitutional right

(Photo by Chris Line)

This is the speech (edited for length) given by Mary Ziegler at FFRF’s national convention in Madison, Wis., on Oct. 13. She was introduced by FFRF Co-President Annie Laurie Gaylor. You can watch the video of the speech (and all other convention speeches) at ffrf.us/con23.
Annie Laurie Gaylor: Our next awardee will be receiving FFRF’s Forward Award, which is an ode by sculptor Zenos Frudakis to the “Forward” statue outside the Wisconsin State Capitol, one of the few public pieces of art by and honoring women. Previous recipients include Cecile Richards, Gloria Steinem, Margaret Atwood and, last year, Whole Woman’s Health Founder Amy Hagstrom Miller.
This year’s recipient is one of the world’s leading authorities on the legal history of the American abortion debate. A native of Butte, Mont., Mary Ziegler is a graduate of Harvard University and Harvard Law School and lives in California with her family. She’s a 2023-2024 Guggenheim Fellow and Martin Luther King Professor of Law at UC Davis.
Her most recent book is Roe: The History of a National Obsession, and before that Dollars for Life: The Anti-abortion Movement and the Fall of the Republican Establishment, which traces how the battle to reverse Roe v. Wade changed the rules of campaign finance, doomed the GOP establishment and made fundamental changes to American democracy.
By Mary Ziegler
When Justice Samuel Alito told us what it meant that Roe v. Wade had been overturned, he told us that the destruction of abortion rights was necessary to protect American democracy.
“The permissibility of abortion and the limitations upon it,” he wrote, “are to be resolved like the most important questions in our democracy by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.”
What I’m going to tell you today is that the history of Roe’s death and the story of what comes next is very much a story about American democracy, but not the one that Alito might want us to believe.
It begins with efforts to bypass changes created in democratic politics, to recognize fetal personhood and to revolutionize what constitutional equality means, not just for women and other people who can get pregnant, but for people of color, people born outside of the United States and others who the Supreme Court has recognized as protected classes.
It’s a history of how efforts have unfolded, not just to change which constitutional rights we have, but to change the ground rules of our elections from the flow of money into politics to the ability of people to vote. And, so, of course, the demise of Roe forces us to consider how we might achieve the demise of Dobbs or what reproductive justice means or what progressives have done wrong in the past that could be remedied in the future.
But it’s also a reminder that the fall of Roe should matter to you even if you are past reproductive age or were never particularly interested in the abortion issue in the first place, because it’s a story about not just the struggles over control of one’s body, but control of the ballot box and the definition of equality.
Beginnings
The struggles over fetal personhood were not, as Alito might have us believe, starting in the 19th century when there was an early anti-abortion movement led by doctors in the American Medical Association. These doctors certainly argued that a fetus was a separate biological person with moral standing, but they had no claims that they made about the Constitution or about rights. This, in some ways, was not surprising. At the time, the American Medical Association was deeply racist and making claims about constitutional rights or personhood almost inevitably meant to draw an analogy to questions of race.
It was in this era that prominent abolitionists from Frederick Douglass to Abraham Lincoln argued that the Supreme Court got it wrong in Dred Scott v. Sanford, when it held that a man of African descent could not be a citizen and therefore had no standing in court. They argued that rights attached to all persons in the United States regardless of race, and that certainly included people of color.
Later generations of anti-abortion activists often compare a fetus to a person of color and say both are denied personhood or humanity. But the American Medical Association had no interest in making this argument, either before or after the text of the Constitution changed, because the analogy presupposes that people of color actually were persons with rights and that was not something that people in the American Medical Association were prepared to acknowledge.
Abortion opponents in the 19th century didn’t say anything about the Constitution and the people who wrote the Constitution didn’t say anything about abortion.
But fetal personhood as a movement became deeply important in the 1960s. At the time, a predominantly Catholic movement initially wanted to argue simply that legal abortion was unnecessary. Catholic physicians argued that pregnancy was no longer dangerous and people no longer died during pregnancy, or that victims of sexual assault couldn’t get pregnant at all.
There were arguments that there might be an implied right to life in the Constitution, just as there are other rights not spelled out in the first 10 amendments of the Constitution. But this was problematic for abortion opponents who were against contraception because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on implied rights had recognized a right to use birth control, as well. The need for a new constitutional argument became even more urgent in a world where abortion was a crime and deep racial and class disparities emerged.
Abortion opponents began arguing that, in fact, abortion was the equality problem and that the true victim of discrimination was the fetus or unborn child. To do so, they had to propose a complete reworking of equality law in the United States. Often, when we ask if someone is a victim of discrimination in the United States, we ask if they belong to a community that’s been historically discriminated against. Anti-abortion lawyers conceded that wasn’t true of fetuses. After all, there had been laws since the 19th century criminalizing virtually all abortions.
They argued that a history of past discrimination was quite simply irrelevant for all Americans, and what mattered instead was physical vulnerability. From the very beginning, this was an argument that would’ve had ramifications for many Americans. If accepted, it would’ve changed the way courts approached discrimination on the basis of race discrimination, on the basis of sex discrimination, on the basis of national origin and much more. It was an argument that captured the imagination of lay Americans who flocked to single-issue anti-abortion organizations across the United States in the 1970s.
Partnership with GOP
For a decade and more, after Roe, the fight for a constitutional amendment led anti-abortion groups to forge a partnership with the Republican Party and sidelined members of the movement who didn’t agree with the Republican Party’s prerogatives, but a constitutional amendment of any kind really was not forthcoming.
Instead of openly defending the idea of personhood under the Constitution, anti-abortion groups just sought to write it into other areas of the law. They did so in a way that shored up their relationship with a Republican Party at the time deeply committed to incarcerating people.
Ronald Reagan tapped into support for various victims’ rights movements, but he redefined victimhood, suggesting that the way to vindicate the rights of victims was not to support them directly, but to harshly punish those who wronged them. Anti-abortion groups picked up on this idea, arguing that the fetus was a victim of crime who had been denied recourse. They fought for fetal homicide laws, which rapidly spread across the country, and for laws authorizing the criminal punishment of pregnant drug users for child abuse or child neglect.
At the same time, anti-abortion lawyers began to promote a vision of constitutional interpretation that would make it much easier to weave religious claims back into the law. And in doing so, they borrowed from conservative Christian litigators who were fighting against the legalization of same-sex intimacy.
At the time, on occasion, when the Supreme Court was figuring out whether someone had a right to do something that wasn’t spelled out in the text or Constitution, they would look to what they called history and tradition. But the justices recognized that history and tradition changed, that our traditions in 2023 are not the traditions we held in 1883 or 1903. Conservative Christian attorneys weren’t happy with this and wanted to argue that traditions couldn’t change because they were rooted in Christianity, which itself didn’t change.
And, so it was, they argued in the 1980s, that “the right to homosexual sodomy” could not be protected because historically and traditionally “Western Christian society has considered the practice of sodomy as within the proper scope of government regulation.” Anti-abortion groups recognize this could be a way for them to get their own constitutional goals achieved. They could argue that historically and traditionally our nation had not recognized a right to abortion.
So, this path to fetal rights seemed smooth and many expected that the way to get rid of Roe was simply to get Republicans elected who would vote to nominate and confirm Supreme Court justices. But that turned out not to be true. In 1992, a Supreme Court chock-full of Republicans voted to preserve what it called the essential holding of Roe, namely, that there was a right to choose abortion before viability.
Looking to Buchanan
It was then that anti-abortion groups looked to the example of Pat Buchanan, who some of you may remember. Pat Buchanan was the Donald Trump of the era to a certain audience; he was good TV. He would literally wave a pitchfork and call his opponent — primary opponent Bob Dole — a funeral director, which was not entirely inaccurate. He also went over well with deeply conservative Republican primary voters until the then-Republican establishment realized that Buchanan was a toxic figure who may well lose a general election, and they buried Buchanan in a tidal wave of money.
Anti-abortion groups realized they needed to compete with that tide of money to get someone like Pat Buchanan over the hump. So, they joined a fight against campaign finance. They partnered with the Federalist Society and the conservative legal movement, and they found a way to argue that they weren’t anti-woman because women were like victims of “big tobacco.”
They were not innocent because it was OK to have an abortion, or it was wrong to punish someone who had knowingly had an abortion. They were victims because they didn’t know what abortion was, just as tobacco users had been deceived by a massive deceitful industry. You see this analogy quite clearly with anti-abortion opponents who still refer to abortion as “big abortion,” just as we see the analogy to “big tobacco.” This argument was powerful because it suggested that women who did know what they were doing could, in fact, be punished for abortion.
The early anti-abortion movement was overwhelmingly Catholic and abortion rights supporters often criticized that movement by saying it was a threat to the separation of church and state, a way for one movement or one group of people to impose their theology on everybody else.
So, anti-abortion groups tried really hard to make it seem as if that wasn’t the case. They refused to take on issues like the death penalty or contraception that could make their cause look more religious. But, by the 2000s, that had begun to change, and again, because of money.
So, money enabled people who had been on the margins to come to the forefront of the anti-abortion movement and to make the possibility of a Pat Buchanan success thinkable. It was this idea that brought anti-abortion groups to the forefront of the litigation of Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee, which was started, as many crucial campaign finance cases in the Supreme Court were, by anti-abortion attorney James Bopp. Citizens United was crucial for the anti-abortion movement, in part because many anti-abortion groups are corporations and Citizens United allows corporations to have unlimited independent expenditures. It also changed the balance of power in the GOP.
But after Citizens United, a great deal of money came in from what we now think of as outside spending — super PACs and nonprofits — that don’t care as much what the mainstream GOP, if such a thing even exists anymore, would think.
Anti-abortion groups understood it was important to limit who could vote, too. And, yet, it was in the lead up to Dobbs that anti-abortion lawyers insisted that it was Roe that was the threat to democracy, that Roe had taken away the abortion issue from the people and stopped them from having a say.
This was the story Brett Kavanaugh told us. He promised a brighter tomorrow after Roe, the idea that we would all just sort this out among ourselves like friends, and that, sooner or later, the bitterness surrounding the abortion issue would fade into the rear view. That was never going to happen, in part, because the Dobbs decision was deeply counter-majoritarian and ran against what Americans had indicated they wanted in poll after poll for 50 years. It’s also wrong, in part, because it’s not what anti-abortion groups wanted, either. They want fetal personhood, which is much more than the Supreme Court gave them in Dobbs.
Aftermath of Dobbs
That’s why we’ve seen a dynamic where, in the aftermath of Dobbs, Americans who support abortion have done remarkably well at the polls, winning every single ballot initiative on abortion rights to come before them since the Dobbs decision. It’s also why, ironically, we’ve seen anti-abortion groups turn time and time again to the courts.
As we speak, the Supreme Court is deciding whether to hear a case, an unprecedented case, arguing that the Food and Drug Administration never had the authority to approve a drug that it signed off on 25 years ago, which would open the door to challenges, to any number of drugs any of us take in our lives.
It’s why we’ve seen anti-abortion groups trying to resurrect the Comstock Act, a 19th-century anti-vice law that I taught as part of my legal history courses as a symbol of a bygone era as, in fact, a de facto ban on all abortions. The Comstock Act’s language suggests that you can’t mail any item intended or adapted for abortion or any other “indecent use.”
It is the case that we’re seeing this, in part, because abortion opponents recognize that fetal personhood is not going to be achievable through popular politics. Voters have never supported the idea of abortion bans with few or no exceptions as early as the 1960s. And, so, ironically, it’s only through conservative justices like Justice Alito that we’ll see this kind of effort succeed.
It’s also why abortion opponents are now potentially threatening other rights, like the right to travel. We’ve seen laws like Idaho’s, which bans abortion trafficking, making it possible to criminally prosecute doctors for performing abortions that are legal in their own jurisdictions, so long as someone that they’re helping is from a state where abortion is not. We’ve seen the attorney general of Alabama signaling that he thinks he has the authority to do the same thing, a deeply uncertain question as a matter of constitutional law. We’ve seen abortion opponents use the argument that all rights that we have now, including even the freedom of speech, should be filtered through this lens of history and tradition, such that speech that our forefathers might not have recognized as legitimate in 1789 or 1868 would no longer enjoy protection, whether that’s political speech, the speech of atheists, the speech of drag queens or much more.
It is that the standard for the anti-abortion movement has long remained a national ban regardless of what voters want.
Voters are never going to endorse one because they seem to be on a runaway train backing abortion rights in red as well as blue states. The key to success will remain conservative judges, and that’s because this, from the beginning, has been about the health of our democracy. The way we got from Roe to Dobbs was not because of a brilliant incrementalist litigation strategy, something progressives are already trying to replicate, chipping away at Dobbs by focusing on the most heartbreaking cases of people with wanted pregnancies being turned away from getting care because they’re not close enough to death.
Of course, good arguments and litigation strategies never hurt, but the anti-abortion movement didn’t win because its arguments were good. It was making the same arguments when I was a baby, when I was 10, and when I was 15 that it did in 2022.
What changed was the people hearing the arguments and the way the Supreme Court behaved. This was a Supreme Court that didn’t seem interested either in its own reputation or in the will of the people, something that’s unusual. The Supreme Court rarely deviates far from popular opinion and suffers consequences when it does. Yet, in Dobbs, the court recognized quite clearly the idea that overturning Roe might be a threat to its legitimacy.
We’ve seen the court take a pretty big hit from that. Justice Alito told us that the only rights we have, other than the ones spelled out in the text of the Constitution, are those that would’ve been recognized at the time the 14th Amendment was written, at a time before women could vote, at a time before people of color could meaningfully vote, and a time at which white men who didn’t have a lot of money really reliably couldn’t vote.
Other rights in jeopardy
And, at that point, of course, what other rights are in jeopardy? Well, of course, the right to contraception, because it was precisely in the 19th century that contraception was being criminalized by people like Anthony Comstock for the first time. Certainly not the right to same-sex marriage, or same-sex intimacy, because those things were being criminalized in different ways in the 19th century.
Potentially, Dobbs means something different for equality, too. This is what conservatives are arguing now in cases involving transgender youth and drag. They’re arguing that Dobbs means you can discriminate against someone based on their ability to get pregnant, and that that’s not sex discrimination. So, pregnancy discrimination is OK, discrimination based on your access to abortion is OK, discrimination based on any kind of health care that only one kind of sex could get potentially is OK.
All of this means that the anti-abortion movement has much broader ambitions for the court. Do I think the court is going to recognize fetal personhood soon? No, I don’t. The court has turned down a fetal personhood case once recently, and Brett Kavanaugh, in his way, suggested, as he put it, that “the Constitution is scrupulously neutral — neither pro-life nor pro-choice.” But, I, from experience, know that nothing is forever with Brett Kavanaugh, and that is a promise with an expiration date.
What we’ve realized instead, then, and we’re seeing much more forcefully now, is that the struggle over abortion has always been about much more than Roe, and indeed about much more than abortion. As women of color have long argued, fights over abortion can’t be separated from the fights over the struggle for good health care or the ability to raise children. What’s become clear from history is that struggles over abortion can’t be divorced from the struggle to have elections dictated by voters rather than money, or the struggle to guarantee that people who want to vote have the ability to do so.
What comes after Dobbs will change how we understand our bodies into whom they belong. But it’ll remake the body politic, too. It’s why we’re seeing efforts to change the language of ballot initiatives or to take ballot initiatives away from voters altogether. It’s why we’re seeing so much effort to channel issues into the courts that voters could resolve themselves. Because from the 1960s onward, the fight over abortion has been a struggle over the separation of church and state, and it’s been a struggle over what we mean about equality under the law and who gets it. It’s become, I think, a fight over the kind of democracy we want to have, or indeed, if we will have one at all anymore.